This paper employs epistemic logic to investigate the philosophical foundations of Bayesian updating in belief revision. By Bayesian updating, we understand the tenet that an agent's degrees of belief-assumed to be encoded as a probability distribution-should be revised by conditionalization on the agent's total knowledge up to that time. A familiar argument, based on the construction of a diachronic Dutch book, purports to show that Bayesian updating is the only rational belief-revision policy. We investigate the conditions under which of the premises of this argument might be satisfied. Specifically, we consider the case of an artificial agent whose language (of thought) features a modal operator T K, where T Kψ has the interpretation "My total knowledge is ψ". We show that every proposition of the form T Kψ is epistemically categorical: it determines, for every proposition ϕ in the agent's language, whether the agent knows that ϕ. We argue that, for certain artificial agents employing such a language, the diachronic Dutch book argument for Bayesian updating is on firm ground.
In the days before their connection to fragments of first-order logic was fully understood, modal logics were conceived of primarily as tools for the philosophical analysis of various fundamental concepts: necessity, time, obligation, knowledge. The axioms of these logics were formalizations of philosophical intuition; the ability to determine the precise consequences of those axioms, and the philosophical perspective it provided were the fruits of that formalization. Two developments have since radically altered this situation. The first is the discovery of relational semantics for modal logic, which made it possible to conceive of modal logic primarily as a collection of formalisms for describing relational structures. The second is the increasing influence of Computer Science in logic, which has pushed issues such as decidability, computational complexity and efficient automation, where modal logics have turned out to exhibit striking behaviour, to the fore. Indeed, it is probably correct to say that modal logicians of the younger generation are predominantly motivated by the special modeltheoretic and complexity-theoretic characteristics of the formal languages they study. These days, modal logic just isn't-well, modal.
The present paper harks back to the older, philosophical tradition in modal logic. Specifically, we employ epistemic logic to investigate the philosophical foundations of Bayesian updating in belief revision. By Bayesian updating, we understand the tenet that an agent's degrees of belief-assumed to be encoded as a probability distribution-should be revised by conditionalization on the agent's total knowledge up to that time. We pose two questions regarding this tenet. First: what reasons do we have for adopting it? Second: what, come to think of it, does it mean anyway? The game-show host then opens one of the other doors that the prize is not behind (there will always be one), and gives the contestant the opportunity to change his guess to the third door. (If the contestant guessed correctly, we assume the game-show host opens one of the other two doors at random.) A rational contestant will accept this offer, since he and his like will on average bag the prize two-thirds of the time. Yet Bayesian updating seems to give the wrong answer here. For let a, b and c stand for the propositions that the prize is behind the respective doors, and let p encode the contestant's initial degrees of belief. Since the contestant initially has no information about where the prize is, we can assume that p(a) = p(b) = p(c) = 1/3, whence, by simple calculation, p(a|¬b) = p(c|¬b) = 1/2. Now suppose, without loss of generality, the contestant guesses the first door (proposition a), and the game-show host opens the second door to reveal that the prize is not behind it. If the contestant conditionalizes on the new information (proposition ¬b), he will see no advantage in switching doors, since he will assign an equal probability to a and c.
There are many ways to see what is going wrong here, and we do not propose to rehearse them all. Rather, we draw attention to the fact that all would be well if only the agent could represent facts about what he knows. For, letting K¬b stand for the proposition that the agent comes to know that ¬b, it is reasonable to suppose that p(K¬b|a) = 1/2 (if the prize is behind the first door, game-show host opens one of the other two at random); likewise, p(K¬b|¬a) = 1/2 (if the prize is not behind the first door, game-show host opens whichever of the other two it is also not behind). Hence: p(a|K¬b) = p(K¬b|a)p(a) p(K¬b|a)p(a) + p(K¬b|¬a)p(¬a) = 1/2 · 1/3 1/2 · 1/3 + 1/2 · 2/3 = 1/3 .
Therefore, p(c|K¬b) = 2/3; so conditionalizing on K¬b leads the contestant to accept the game-show host's offer and switch choices to the third door. Thus, we have a way of reconciling the Monty Hall paradox with Bayesian updating: enrich the agent's language of thought so that he can conditionalize not on the objective information he obtains, but rather, on the subjective fact of his having obtained that information. (I use 'subjective' here in the sense of 'about the agent's state of mind'; subjective facts, in this sense, are just as real as objective ones.) Once this is done, conditionalization appears to give the correct results. But, why was this process of epistemic ascent (as we might call it) necessary in this particular case? And what assurance do we have that it will be sufficient in general? More concretely: suppose our game-show contestant does, as we recommend, conditionalize on K¬b (rather than on ¬b). Why can we not construct a diachronic Dutch book against him by exploiting his failure to conditionalize on ¬b?
The answer is that the Dutch book argument works only if we (the bookmakers) know what the agent's degrees of belief are really going to be if and when ψ turns out true; only then can we decide which bets to offer to buy and sell, and at what prices. But taking ψ to be the proposition ¬b in the Monty Hall paradox (as presented above) fails to satisfy this requirement. To see this, suppose-consistently with ¬b-that the prize is in fact behind the first door (i.e. the contestant's original guess was correct). Then the game-show host might open either of the other doors, whence the contestant might learn either of ¬b or ¬c. That is: we, the bookmakers, cannot infer the contestant's degrees of belief given merely that ¬b is true. Now contrast this with the case where ψ is K¬b. In the context of the described scenario, the proposition K¬b determines precisely which propositions the contestant knows. Hence, as long as the contestant's degrees of belief are determined by what he has come to know, the proposition ψ = K¬b allows us to construct the Dutch book as explained in the above argument. That is why the argument sanctions conditionalization on the proposition K¬b, but not on the proposition ¬b. And that is why, in this case, we need to enrich the contestant's language thus far, and no further.
This explanation takes the Dutch book argument to rest on the following two assumptions:
A1: The agent's degrees of belief at any time are a function of what propositions in L he has come to know by that time.
A2: At any time, there exists a true proposition ψ in L, such that the truth of ψ determines, for the bookmaker, what the agent will have come to know by that time.
In the context of human reasoning, assumption A1-the view that our evidence arrives in the form of Protokollsätze of whose truth we can be certain-is widely rejected (see, e.g. Jeffrey [4] ). However, in the context of artificial agents, with digitized, and hence propositionally describable, perceptual inputs, A1 is almost certain to be satisfied; and an argument restricted to this context is still of interest. Objection: does this not mean that such artificial agents are encumbered with literally millions of 'tiny' Protokollsätze about their transducers? Answer: yes; but why encumbered? In fact, exactly this sort of Bayesian inference is now routinely and successfully employed in a wide variety of computing problems.
This leaves us with the assumption A2, which, as we shall see, presents us with an intriguing logical challenge. Let L be a formal language containing a modal operator K, where Kψ has the interpretation "The agent knows that ψ at time t". (For simplicity, we fix a time t within the range of times over which A2 quantifies; reference to this time will then be implicit in the following discussion.) For the scenario of the Monty Hall paradox, this is all we need: it is assumed as part of that scenario that the proposition K¬b, if true, completely determines the agent's state of knowledge at the time in question. But in general, we can expect no such luck: propositions about what the agent does know imply very little about what he does not know. What we seek, then, is a modal operator T K, where T Kψ has the interpretation "The agent's total knowledge at time t is ψ", and with the property that T Kψ is epistemically categorical: for all propositions χ ∈ L, either T Kψ → Kχ or T Kψ → ¬Kχ is a logical truth. For an artificial agent using such a language, the diachronic Dutch book argument for belief updating by conditionalization on T Kψ would be on firm ground. Can we define such an operator? That is the topic of this paper.
Syntax and semantics
We begin by setting out the logical framework within which the ensuing analysis will be carried out. Definition 1. Assume as given a countable set of variables, a countable set of names and, for each n (0 ≤ n), a countable set of n-ary predicate letters. The symbol = is one of the binary predicate letters. We call the 0-ary predicate letters proposition letters. A term is a variable or a name. An F OLT K-formula is a member of the smallest set of expressions satisfying the following rules:
if r is an n-ary predicate letter and t 1 , . . . , t n are terms, then r(t 1 , . . . , t n ) is a formula of F OLT K;
if ϕ and ψ are formulas of F OLT K and x is a variable, then ϕ ∧ ψ, ϕ ∨ ψ, ¬ϕ, ∃xϕ, ∀xϕ, Kϕ and T Kϕ are formulas of F OLT K.
A PCT K-formula is an F OLT K-formula involving no occurrences of ∃ or ∀ and no n-ary relations for n > 0. We standardly refer to F OLT K-or PCT Kformulas simply as formulas. Formulas involving no occurrences of T K are called basic; formulas involving no occurrences of K or T K are called objective. Formulas in which every predicate letter appears within the scope of either K or T K are called subjective. We use the constants , ⊥ and connectives →, ↔ as abbreviations with their usual meanings. A formula with no free variables is a sentence.
The general semantic framework used here is that of Levesque [5] (see also Levesque and Lakemeyer [6] ). Models for F OLT K-formulas are non-empty sets of "interpretations", where an interpretation is just a model of the underlying non-modal language. The most notable features are that names denote rigidly and uniquely, and that the domain of quantification is covered by the names. Definition 2. An interpretation w is a function mapping any n-ary predicate letter r to a set r w of n-tuples of names, subject to the constraint that = w is the identity relation on the set of names. (As usual, we assume that there is exactly one 0-tuple of names.)
Let W be a non-empty set of interpretations, let w ∈ W , and let ϕ be a sentence of F OLT K. We define W |= w ϕ inductively as follows:
If r is a predicate letter and a 1 , . . . , a n are names, then W |= w r(a 1 , . . . , a n ) if and only if a 1 , . . . , a n ∈ r w ; Here, ϕ[x/a] denotes the result of substituting the name a for every free occurrence of x in ϕ. (The symbol is for future reference.)
Since only sentences receive truth-values, we will henceforth notate free variables explicitly. Thus, ϕ will denote a sentence, and ψ(x) a formula with no free variables other thanx. Note that if ϕ is objective, we can write |= w ϕ for W |= w ϕ, and if ϕ is subjective, we can write W |= ϕ for W |= w ϕ. More generally, we write W |= ϕ to mean W |= w ϕ for all w ∈ W , and |= ϕ to mean W |= ϕ for all W . We say ϕ is satisfiable if W |= w ϕ for some W and some w ∈ W , and we say ϕ is valid if |= ϕ. Clearly, the usual S5-axioms for K are valid.
Note that clause above, giving the semantics of T Kϕ, quantifies only over objective sentences χ. Allowing χ to range over arbitrary sentences in would result in a non-terminating recursive definition of |=. (To determine whether W |= T Kϕ, we would would need to determine whether, for various sentences χ involving occurrences of T K, |= Kϕ → χ implies W |= ¬Kχ; but to determine either of these things, we would in turn need to determine whether W |= w χ for various W and w ∈ W .) Moreover, allowing χ to range over basic sentences in , though it would result in a well-formed definition, would have other undesirable consequences. Consider, for example, any sentence of the form T Kp 1 . We do not want this sentence to be unsatisfiable, since it seems reasonable that an agent may have simply learned p 1 and nothing else. Yet Kp 1 fails to imply both p 2 and ¬Kp 2 , so that, without the restriction of χ to objective sentences, clause would make T Kp 1 entail both ¬Kp 2 and ¬K¬Kp 2 , which is unsatisfiable on our semantics. Hence the restriction of χ to objective sentences in .
However, this restriction creates a problem. Consider the following consequence of . Lemma 1. For any sentence ϕ and any objective sentence χ, |= T Kϕ → Kχ or |= T Kϕ → ¬Kχ.
Proof. Let χ be objective. If |= Kϕ → χ, then |= Kϕ → Kχ; and since |= T Kϕ → Kϕ, we have |= T Kϕ → Kχ. On the other hand, if |= Kϕ → χ, then, from the semantics of the T K-operator, |= T Kϕ → ¬Kχ.
Lemma 1 states that, as we might say, T Kϕ is epistemically categorical for objective sentences χ. Yet we would prefer that T Kϕ were epistemically categorical for arbitrary χ, for that is what, according to A2, the diachronic Dutch book argument requires. One of our main results (Theorem 4) is that Lemma 1 can be strengthened in just this way.
It is worth pausing to see why this result is surprising. Lemma 1 guarantees that any two agents whose total knowledge is ϕ know the same objective sentences. But it is easy to construct an example of two agents who know the same objective sentences but who do not know the same basic sentences. Let p be a unary predicate letter, and enumerate the names as {c i } 0≤i . Define the interpretation w 0 by setting |= w0 p(c j ) if and only if j is odd; and define the interpretation w i , for i ≥ 1 by setting |= wi p(c j ) if and only if j is odd or j = 2i. Assume that all other predicate letters are assigned the empty interpretation. Let W = {w i |i ≥ 0} and W = {w i |i ≥ 1}. It follows that, for all objective χ, W |= Kχ if and only if W |= Kχ. However, we have W |= K∃x(p(x)∧¬Kp(x)) but W |= ¬K∃x(p(x) ∧ ¬Kp(x)). The analysis below shows that this sort of situation cannot arise in the presence of total knowledge.
We close this section with a very simple remark.
Proof. Straightforward from standard S5-identities.
See Corollary 3 for a similar, but more difficult, result of this kind.
The propositional case
We begin with an observation establishing the consistency of certain totalknowledge sentences.
Lemma 3. If a sentence ϕ of F OLT K is objective and satisfiable, then T Kϕ is satisfiable. Indeed, if W is the set of assignments w such that |= w ϕ, then W |= T Kϕ.
Proof. Since ϕ is satisfiable, W = ∅. By construction, W |= Kϕ. Moreover, for any objective χ such that |= Kϕ → χ, we have |= ϕ → χ, so let w be an interpretation such that |= w ϕ ∧ ¬χ. Since w ∈ W , W |= ¬Kχ. Thus, W |= T Kϕ.
The analysis of T K in the propositional case is very easy, and relies on the existence of the following normal-form theorem.
Lemma 4. Any basic sentence of PCT K is equivalent to a sentence of the form
in which the ψ h , χ h,i and π h are objective.
Thus, K-operators occurring in the scope of other K-operators in basic PCT K sentences can always be eliminated. Of course, F OLT K lacks this feature: the embedded K in K∃x(p(x) ∧ ¬Kp(x)) cannot be removed. As a corollary of this normal form lemma, we have the following.
Lemma 5. Let ϕ be a satisfiable, basic sentence of PCT K. Then there exists a basic (in fact, objective) sentence ψ of PCT K such that ϕ ∧ T Kψ is satisfiable.
Proof. Assume without loss of generality that ϕ is of the form given in Lemma 4, with the first disjunct, Kψ 1 ∧ ¬Kχ 1,1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬Kχ 1,m1 ∧ π 1 , satisfiable. Hence, |= ψ 1 → χ 1,j for all j (1 ≤ j ≤ m 1 ), and |= ψ 1 → ¬π 1 . Let W be the set of assignments w such that |= w ψ 1 . Thus, for all j (1 ≤ j ≤ m 1 ), there exists w j ∈ W such that |= wj ¬χ 1,j ; and there exists w ∈ W such that |= w π 1 . By Lemma 3, W |= T Kψ 1 . Thus,
and hence W |= w T Kψ 1 ∧ ϕ.
Lemma 5 ensures that, in the propositional case, the assumption that there is a sentence which is the agent's total knowledge does not change the finitary logic of knowledge: any (basic) sentence which is satisfiable without this assumption is satisfiable in its presence. We show below that Lemma 5 is false for F OLT K.
The restricted first-order case
The analysis of F OLT K is somewhat involved, and so we approach it in two stages. In the present section, we prove the main theorems of interest, under the assumption that certain formulas occurring in those theorems are basic. This assumption is then lifted in Section 5. The material of the present section was presented, in abbreviated form, in Pratt-Hartmann [8] .
The following construction is crucial in understanding the behaviour of T K in the first-order case.
Definition 3. A permutation of individuals is a function from the set of names to the set of names which is 1-1 and onto. Let f be a permutation of individuals; we extend f to apply to interpretations and formulas as follows. If w is an interpretation, for any n-ary predicate letter r, let r f (w) be the set of tuples a 1 , . . . , a n such that
, and let f be defined on non-atomic formulas by
Thus, when applying f to interpretations and formulas, we switch round the extensions of predicates and the names occurring in formulas in corresponding ways.
Lemma 6. If f is a permutation of individuals, then f is also 1-1 and onto on the set of interpretations, the set of formulas, the set of basic formulas and the set of objective formulas. Furthermore, for all sentences ϕ, sets of interpretations W and interpretations w ∈ W , W |= w ϕ if and only if f (W ) |= f (w) f (ϕ).
Proof. The first part of the lemma is obvious. The second part follows by structural induction on ϕ.
Definition 4. Letx = x 1 , . . . , x n be a tuple of distinct variables, and let X be the set of these variables: X = {x 1 , . . . , x n }. Let A = {a 1 , . . . , a m } (with the a i distinct) be a set of names. Let P 1 , . . . , P m be a set of (possibly empty) disjoint subsets of X and let P m+1 , . . . , P m+l be a partition of X \ 1≤i≤m P i .
For a givenx and A, denote the set of all such formulas by ∆ A (x). If n = 0, set ∆ A = { }.
Intuitively, δ(x) assigns every variable inx to one of m + l 'boxes' P 1 , . . . , P m+l . Variables assigned to the same box are asserted to be identical, and variables assigned to different boxes are asserted to be distinct. Variables assigned to box P i (1 ≤ i ≤ m) are asserted to be identical to a i , and variables assigned to any box other than P i (1 ≤ i ≤ m) are asserted to be distinct from a i .
Lemma 7. Letx = x 1 , . . . , x n be a tuple of distinct variables, and A a set of names. Then ∆ A (x) is a partition. That is: |= ∀x ∆ A (x), and |= ∀x¬(δ(x) ∧ δ (x)) for distinct δ(x), δ (x) ∈ ∆ A (x).
Proof. Obvious.
We note that distribution formulas are rigid: they are satisfied by the same tuples regardless of the interpretation. Hence we sometimes write |= δ(ā) without mentioning W or w.
Lemma 8. Let ϕ be a sentence and ψ(x) a formula. Let C be the set of names occurring in either formula. Then there exists a disjunction π(x) of formulas in ∆ C (x) such that, for all tuplesā, |= π(ā) if and only if |= ϕ → ψ(ā).
Proof. Suppose thatā andā satisfy the same δ(x) in ∆ C (x), and that |= ϕ → ψ(ā ). We claim that |= ϕ → ψ(ā). For, in that case, the mappingā →ā is welldefined, and extends to a permutation of individuals f such that f is the identity on C. Hence f (ϕ) = ϕ and f (ψ(ā )) = ψ(ā). By Lemma 6, |= ϕ → ψ(ā).
(As usual, we take ∅ to be ⊥.) Suppose |= ϕ → ψ(ā). Since ∆ C (x) is a partition, |= δ(ā) for some δ(x) ∈ ∆ C (x). Therefore, |= π(ā). Conversely, suppose |= π(ā). Then |= δ(ā) for some δ(x), such that, for someā , |= δ(ā ) and |= ϕ → ψ(ā ). Butā andā satisfy the same δ(x) in ∆ C (x); and we have just shown that, in this case, |= ϕ → ψ(ā ) implies |= ϕ → ψ(ā).
Lemma 9. Let ϕ be a sentence and ψ(x) an objective formula. Let C be the set of names occurring in either formula. Then there exists a disjunction π(x) of formulas in ∆ C (x) such that |= T Kϕ → ∀x(Kψ(x) ↔ π(x)).
Proof. By Lemma 8 (with
Lemma 9 is particularly useful in conjunction with the following (almost trivial) observation.
Lemma 10. Let η(x) be subjective, and let π(x) be rigid. Let ξ(ȳ) be any formula containing an occurrence of η(x) that does not lie within the scope of a T K-operator. Finally, let ξ (ȳ) be the result of substituting, for that occurrence, the formula π(x).
Proof. Routine structural induction on ξ.
The condition that the occurrence of η(x) being substituted does not occur within the scope of a T K-operator in ξ(ȳ) is essential in Lemma 10. To see this, let p be a proposition letter. By Lemma 3, T Kp is satisfiable, and by Lemma 2, T Kp is logically equivalent to T K(Kp). Let W |= T K(Kp), then. Trivially, W |= Kp ↔ , and, of course, the sentence is rigid. But W |= T K .
We are now in a position to establish our first main result. Theorem 1. Let ϕ be a sentence and ψ(x) a basic formula. Then there is a disjunction π(x) of elements of ∆ C (x) for some C, such that |= T Kϕ → ∀x(Kψ(x) ↔ π(x)).
Proof. We proceed by induction on the number n of occurrences of K in ψ(x). The case n = 0 is handled by Lemma 9. If n > 0, let Kψ (x ) be a subformula of ψ(x), with ψ (x ) objective. By Lemma 9, let π (x ) be such that |= T Kϕ → ∀x (Kψ (x ) ↔ π (x )), and let ψ (x) be the result of substituting π (x ) for Kψ (x ) in ψ(x). Since ψ(x) is basic, the embedded occurrence of Kψ (x ) cannot occur within the scope of a T K-operator, so that, by Lemma 10, |= T Kϕ → ∀x(Kψ(x) ↔ Kψ (x)). Since ψ (x) has fewer than n occurrences of K, the result follows by inductive hypothesis.
Theorem 1 restricts ψ(x) to be basic, so that Lemma 10 can be applied. As explained above, this step is not valid if T K-operators are present. In fact, Theorem 1 does hold in the general case, but the induction is more delicate, and we postpone it until Section 5.
Corollary 1. For all sentences ϕ and all basic sentences ψ, |= T Kϕ → Kψ or |= T Kϕ → ¬Kψ.
Proof. By Theorem 1, |= T Kϕ → ∀x(Kψ ↔ π), where π is a disjunction of elements of ∆ C for some C (with a 0-tuple of variables). Hence π is ⊥ or .
Corollary 2. Let ϕ be a sentence and ψ(x) a basic formula with one free variable. Suppose that W |= T Kϕ. Then the set {a : W |= Kψ(a)} is finite or cofinite.
Proof. By Theorem 1, |= T Kϕ → ∀x(Kψ(x) ↔ π(x)), where π(x) is a disjunction of elements of ∆ C (x) for some C (with a single variable x). Clearly, the set of a satisfying π(x) is finite or cofinite.
Recall that, in the propositional case, if ϕ is satisfiable, then we can find ψ such that ϕ ∧ T Kψ is satisfiable. In the first-order case, this is no longer true.
Theorem 2.
There exists a satisfiable basic sentence ϕ such that, for all sentences ψ, |= ϕ → ¬T Kψ.
Proof. Consider the sentence ϕ + given by
It is obvious that, if W |= w ϕ + , then, for infinitely many a, W |= Kp(a). Now let ϕ − be a similar sentence implying that, for infinitely many a, ¬Kp(a). Let ϕ be ϕ + ∧ ϕ − . It is not difficult to see that ϕ is satisfiable. On the other hand, by Corollary 2, |= ϕ → ¬T Kψ for all sentences ψ.
Thus, in the first-order case, the assumption that there is total knowledge changes the finitary logic of knowledge: basic sentences that are satisfiable in the absence of this assumption may be unsatisfiable in its presence.
Next, we show that total knowledge of any basic sentence is logically equivalent to total knowledge of an objective sentence. We need the following general lemma.
Lemma 11. Let ϕ and ψ be sentences such that |= T Kϕ → Kψ, |= Kψ → Kϕ and T Kϕ is satisfiable. Then |= T Kϕ ↔ T Kψ.
Proof. Suppose W |= T Kϕ. Then W |= Kψ. Let χ be objective with |= Kψ → χ. Then |= Kϕ → χ, because |= Kψ → Kϕ. So W |= ¬Kχ. Hence W |= T Kψ.
Conversely, suppose W |= T Kψ. Since |= Kψ → Kϕ, we certainly have W |= Kϕ. To establish W |= T Kϕ, we suppose χ is objective with |= Kϕ → χ, and show that W |= ¬Kχ. Now, |= Kϕ → χ implies |= T Kϕ → ¬Kχ. This in turn implies |= Kψ → χ, since otherwise, given that |= T Kϕ → Kψ, we would have |= T Kϕ → Kχ, contradicting the hypothesized consistency of T Kϕ. Since W |= T Kψ and |= Kψ → χ, we have W |= ¬Kχ, as required.
We mention, as an aside, the following reassuring corollary of Lemma 11.
Corollary 3. For all sentences ϕ, |= T Kϕ ↔ T K(T Kϕ).
Proof. If |= T Kϕ is unsatisfiable, then |= T K(T Kϕ) is also unsatisfiable, so the result is immediate. On the other hand, if |= T Kϕ is satisfiable, then, since |= T Kϕ → K(T Kϕ) and |= K(T Kϕ) → Kϕ, the result follows by taking ψ to be T Kϕ in Lemma 11. Theorem 3. Let ϕ be a basic sentence. Then there exists an objective sentence ϕ * such that |= T Kϕ ↔ T Kϕ * .
Proof. If ϕ is already objective or if T Kϕ is unsatisfiable, the result is trivial, so we may assume otherwise. Let Kψ 1 (x 1 ) be a subformula of ϕ, with ψ 1 (x 1 ) objective. Then we can find ρ 1 such that |= T Kϕ → ρ 1 , where ρ 1 is the sentence ∀x 1 (Kψ(x 1 ) ↔ π 1 (x)) constructed as in Lemma 9. Let ϕ 1 be the result of substituting π 1 (x) for Kψ(x 1 ) in ϕ. Since ϕ is basic, Lemma 10 implies
objective, we proceed as before, obtaining |= T Kϕ ↔ T K(ϕ 2 ∧ ρ 1 ∧ ρ 2 ), and so on, until we eventually obtain |= T Kϕ ↔ T K(ϕ m ∧ ρ 1 ∧ · · · ∧ ρ m ), with ϕ m objective and m ≥ 1. Now consider in more detail the sentence ρ 1 ∧ · · · ∧ ρ m . Ignoring the previous numbering, this may be written out as a conjunction of the form
where the δ j (x j ), δ j (x j ) are conjunctions of equality and inequality formulas, and the ψ j (x j ), ψ j (x j ) are objective. Since the δ j (x j ) are rigid, we have
Hence we can omit the K from the relevant conjuncts and set ϕ * to be
). We claim that, ifā is a tuple of names such that |= δ j (ā), then |= Kϕ * → ψ j (ā). For suppose, to the contrary, that |= δ j (ā), but |= Kϕ * → ψ j (ā). Since
, we have |= T Kϕ → ¬Kψ j (ā). On the other hand, since |= T Kϕ → ϕ * , we have |= T Kϕ → ψ j (ā), contradicting the satisfiability of T Kϕ. Thus, if |= δ j (ā), then |= Kϕ * → ψ j (ā), whence, since ψ j (ā) is objective, |= T Kϕ * → ¬Kψ j (ā j ). We have therefore shown
Trivially,
And finally, by Lemma 3, T Kϕ * is satisfiable. Using Lemma 11, (1) and (2) 
, and so |= T Kϕ * ↔ T Kϕ.
The unrestricted first-order case
The main task of this section is to strengthen Corollary 1 and Theorem 3 so that the restrictions to basic sentences can be removed.
Definition 5. If ϕ(x) is a formula, the T K-rank of ϕ(x) is the maximum depth of nesting of T K-operators in ϕ(x). A T K-formula is any formula of the form T Kϕ(x).

Thus, the T K-rank of ϕ(x) is zero if and only if ϕ(x) is basic.
We may now state and prove the promised result on the epistemic categoricity of the T K-operator. Before giving the proof of this theorem, we derive two useful corollaries.
Corollary 4. Suppose |= T Kϕ ∧ T Kψ is a satisfiable sentence. Then |= T Kϕ → T Kψ.
Proof. Since T Kψ → Kψ, we certainly cannot have |= T Kϕ → ¬Kψ. By Theorem 4, then, |= T Kϕ → Kψ. We claim that, for any objective formula χ,
For suppose |= Kϕ → χ, and |= Kψ → χ. Then |= T Kϕ → Kχ, and |= T Kψ → ¬Kχ, contradicting the satisfiability of T Kϕ ∧ T Kψ. It then easily follows that |= T Kϕ → T Kψ. The reverse implication follows symmetrically.
The following result is also a corollary of Theorem 4.
Lemma 12. Let ϕ be a sentence and ψ(x) a formula. Let C be the set of names occurring in either ϕ or ψ(x). Define
Proof. If |= T Kϕ → T Kψ(ā) then, since ∆ C (x) is a partition,ā satisfies some disjunct of π(x), so that |= π(ā). Conversely, if |= π(ā), then we can findā such thatā andā satisfy the same disjunct of π(x) and |= T Kϕ → T Kψ(ā ). Sinceā andā satisfy the same disjunct of π(x), we can find a permutation of individuals f such that f :ā →ā and f is the identity on C. Thus, f (T Kϕ) = T Kϕ and f (T Kψ(ā )) = T Kψ(ā). By Lemma 6, |= T Kϕ → T Kψ(ā). Thus, for any tupleā, |= π(ā) if and only if |= T Kϕ → T Kψ(ā).
Let W be any set of interpretations and letā be any tuple such that W |= T Kϕ∧ T Kψ(ā). By Corollary 4, |= T Kϕ → T Kψ(ā). By the result of the previous paragraph, |= π(ā). Hence |= T Kϕ → ∀x(T Kψ(x) → π(x)). Conversely, let W be any set of interpretations andā any tuple such that W |= T Kϕ ∧ π(ā). By the result of the previous paragraph, |= T Kϕ → T Kψ(ā), so W |= T Kψ(ā).
Before we proceed to the proof of Theorem 4, we should note how it is used by Corollary 4 and Lemma 12. Suppose that the sentence ψ in the statement of Corollary 4 has TK-rank less than N , for some integer N . Then, for the proof to go through, we need only assume that Theorem 4 holds for sentences ψ with TK-rank less than N . Likewise, suppose that the formula ψ(x) in the statement of Lemma 12 has TK-rank less than N , for some integer N . Again, for the proof to go through, we need only assume that Corollary 4 holds for sentences ψ(ā) with TK-rank less than N , and hence we need only assume that Theorem 4 holds for sentences with TK-rank less than N . This observation helps us to present the proof of Theorem 4 more succinctly.
Proof of Theorem 4:
We proceed by induction on the T K-rank N of ψ. The case N = 0 is dealt with by Corollary 1.
Suppose N > 0 and that the result holds for all ϕ whatever, and for all ψ with T K-rank less than N . Let T Kψ (x) be a maximal T K-subformula of ψ, so that the TK-rank of of ψ (x) is less than N . Hence we can apply Lemma 12 by inductive hypothesis, obtaining a rigid formula π(x) such that
Now let ψ 1 be the result of substituting π(x) for T Kψ (x) in ψ. Since T Kψ (x) is a maximal T K-formula in ψ-that is, it does not occur embedded in any TKoperator, we infer, by Lemma 10, that |= T Kϕ → (Kψ ↔ Kψ 1 ). Proceeding in the same way, we eliminate the remaining maximal T K-subformulas of ψ 1 obtaining, say, the basic sentence ψ m with |= T Kϕ → (Kψ ↔ Kψ m ). The result then follows from Corollary 1.
Our final objective is to generalize Theorem 3.
Lemma 13. Let ϕ, χ be basic sentences and let ψ 1 (x 1 ), . . . , ψ n (x n ) be any formulas. Then |= ϕ → χ if and only if
Proof. For the non-trivial direction, suppose that W |= w ϕ ∧ ¬χ. Let p 1 , p 2 , . . . be the proposition letters not occurring in ϕ or χ, and let the arity ofx i be m i . For all i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), letā i,1 ,ā i,2 , . . . be any enumeration of all the m i -tuples of names. Now modify the interpretations in W according to the following recipe: 
Lemma 14. Let ϕ be a basic sentence and let ψ 1 (x 1 ), . . . , ψ n (x n ) be any formulas. Define
Then |= T Kθ → T Kϕ.
Proof. Observe that
Now suppose W |= T Kθ. Certainly, then, W |= Kϕ. Now let χ be objective with |= Kϕ → χ. By Lemma 13 (using Kϕ in pace of ϕ), and by (3), we have |= Kθ → χ, and so W |= ¬Kχ. Thus, W |= T Kϕ.
Lemma 15. Let ϕ be a basic sentence and let ψ 1 (x 1 ), . . . , ψ n (x n ) be any formulas. Suppose T Kθ is satisfiable, where
Then |= T Kϕ ↔ T Kθ.
Proof. By Lemma 14, |= T Kθ → T Kϕ. It follows that T Kϕ is satisfiable.
Certainly, |= T Kϕ → Kϕ. We claim further that T Kϕ → ∀x i ¬T Kψ i (x i ) for all i (1 ≤ i ≤ n). For suppose otherwise: letā be a tuple of names such that T Kϕ ∧ T Kψ i (ā) is satisfiable. By Corollary 4, |= T Kϕ → T Kψ i (ā), and since |= T Kθ → T Kϕ, we have both |= T Kθ → T Kψ i (ā) and |= T Kθ → ¬T Kψ i (ā), contradicting the satisfiability of T Kθ. This establishes the claim. Thus, we have |= T Kϕ → Kθ; and trivially, |= Kθ → Kϕ. Since T Kϕ is satisfiable, Lemma 11 yields T Kϕ ↔ T Kθ. Proof. We proceed by induction on the T K-rank N of ϕ. The case N = 0 is dealt with by Theorem 3.
Suppose that N > 0 and that the result holds for all ϕ with T K-rank less than N . We may suppose that T Kϕ is satisfiable, since otherwise we need only set ϕ * := ⊥. Let T Kψ 1 (x 1 ), . . . , T Kψ n (x n ) be the maximal T K-subformulas of ϕ (i.e. those not occurring within the scope of any other T K-operator). By Lemma 12, we can find rigid formulas
and we are assuming that T Kϕ is satisfiable. Hence, by Lemma 11,
Letφ be the result of substituting
, and since the T Kψ i (x i ) do not occur within the scope of any T K-operators in ϕ, Lemma 10 yields |= θ → (ϕ ↔φ), whence
Similarly, from (4), Lemma 10 yields |= T Kϕ → (φ ↔ ϕ). Combining this again with (4), we easily obtain
From (5) and (6), and the satisfiability of T Kϕ, we obtain, by Lemma 11, T Kϕ ↔ T Kθ. It follows that T Kθ is satisfiable. We remark that, by construction, the T K-rank of each of the ψ i (x i ) is less than N , and thatφ is basic. We consider two cases: Case 1: π i (x i ) is satisfiable for some i (1 ≤ i ≤ n). Letā be a tuple such that |= π i (ā). Then, since T Kθ is satisfiable, so is T Kθ ∧ T Kψ i (ā). By Corollary 4, |= T Kθ ↔ T Kψ i (ā), and since the T K-rank of ψ i (ā) is less than N , by inductive hypothesis, we can find an objective ϕ * such that |= T Kψ i (ā) ↔ T Kϕ * . Hence, |= T Kϕ ↔ T Kϕ * and we are done.
Moreover, since T Kθ is satisfiable, Lemma 15 yields |= T Kθ ↔ T Kφ. Sincẽ ϕ is basic, Theorem 3 guarantees the existence of an objective ϕ * such that |= T Kφ ↔ T Kϕ * . Hence |= T Kϕ ↔ T Kϕ * and we are done.
Introducing time
So far, we have finessed the issue of time in the language F OLT K, treating the temporal reference in Kϕ, T Kϕ, in the context of an agent's evolving degrees of belief, as implicit. However, it is straightforward to introduce temporal arguments to these operators; that is the subject of this section. For simplicity, let us assume that time is discrete, and that, after some finite time, all knowledge ceases. The former assumption is reasonable for artificial agents; the latter is reasonable for all agents, natural or artificial. Fix some integer N , then, and consider two families of operators: {K n } n≤N , and {T K n } n≤N , where K n ϕ has the interpretation "the agent knows at time n that ϕ", and similarly for T K n ϕ. In addition, we shall assume that the agent never forgets. Again, this assumption is reasonable for some kinds of artificial agent. In this context, it is sufficient to restrict attention to formulas which are 'forwardlooking'-that is, which feature no temporal operator with index m embedded within the scope of a temporal operator with a larger index n. After all, at the time n − 1, we may assume all formulas of the forms K m ψ and T K m ψ to have probability 1 or 0, and therefore not to be any longer relevant for the purpose of conditionalization. Accordingly, we define a series of languages F OLT K For convenience of expression, we call a formula ϕ ∈ F OLT K N n-objective if it involves no operators K m or T K m with m ≤ n. Thus, the notion of an n-objective formula is the natural generalization of the notion of an objective formula in the context of F OLT K. In particular, an N -objective F OLT K Nformula involves no occurrences of modal operators at all; and an n-objective
-formula. The semantics of F OLT K N can then be given along the same lines as for F OLT K; the chief difference is that formulas must now be evaluated with respect to a structure modelling the evolving knowledge of the agent. Accordingly, let us define a structure to be a pair M = W, {∼ n } 1≤n≤N , where W is a set of interpretations, and each ∼ n (1 ≤ n ≤ N ) an equivalence relation on W . To capture the assumption that our agent does not forget previously acquired information, we take m ≤ n to imply ∼ m ⊇∼ n . We can now define the truth-conditions for F OLT K N -formulas recursively in much the same way as for F OLT K. We give here only the clauses governing the modal operators, since the remaining clauses are essentially identical to the non-temporal case. Taking M to be the structure W, {∼ n } 1≤n≤N , we define:
M |= w K n ϕ if and only if, for all w ∈ W such that w ∼ n w , M |= w ϕ; M |= w T K n ϕ if and only if M |= w K n ϕ and M |= w ¬K n χ for all n-objective sentences χ such that |= K n ϕ → χ.
It is easy to see that, for all N ≥ 1, the recursion in in these clauses terminates properly.
The theorems established in Sections 3-5 then transfer unproblematically to the temporalized case. In particular, we have the following two facts for all n (1 ≤ n ≤ N ). (i) Let ϕ and ψ be any sentences of F OLT K N n . Then |= T K n ϕ → K n ψ or |= T K n ϕ → ¬K n ψ. (ii) Let ϕ be any sentence of F OLT K N n . Then there exists an n-objective sentence ϕ * such that |= T K n ϕ ↔ T K n ϕ * . Finally, we mention the problem of whether the assumption of mortality could be relaxed. That is: could we devise a single (finitary) language featuring operators K 1 , K 2 , . . . and T K 1 , T K 2 , . . .? Formally, the most obvious relaxation of the semantics given above for F OLT K N would yield non-terminating recursive definitions. Moreover, informally, it is unclear that the sought-after operators would make sense. For consider the set of formulas
Could all these propositions be true together? On the one hand, they contain nothing we would wish to regard as an obvious consistency; on the other, it is disquieting that an agent should be regarded as having, as his only knowledge at any given time, the knowledge that, at the next time, he will know more. We should regard this question as, at present, unsolved. However, as we remarked above, the assumption of a finite life-span is reasonable for all agents, natural or artificial.
Conclusion
We began this paper by recounting the well-known diachronic Dutch book argument in support of Bayesian inference-the policy of revising degrees of belief by conditionalization. We showed that this argument is most persuasive in the special case of an artificial agent whose language of thought contains epistemically categorical propositions-that is, propositions the mere truth of which determine the agent's knowledge, and hence its degrees of belief. We set about constructing such a language. Specifically, we defined a first-order language, F OLT K, containing modal operators K and T K having the interpretations "The agent knows that . . . " and "The agent's total knowledge is that . . . ", respectively. We showed that all propositions of the form T Kψ are epistemically categorical in the required sense. We further showed that, for such an agent, total knowledge is always total knowledge of an objective proposition. We indicated briefly how these operators could be transferred to a (bounded) temporal setting. For artificial agents employing such a language, Bayesian inference is the correct belief-revision policy: if the agent's degrees of belief are represented by the probability distribution p, and its new total knowledge is the objective proposition ψ, then the agent should revise its degrees of belief by conditionalizing on T Kψ. Put another way: for such agents, the language F OLT K represents the right degree of epistemic ascent to save the diachronic Dutch book argument.
